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1The idea that political control of monetary policy has potentially adverse
consequences can be dated back at least to Simons (1936). It has played an important
role more recently both in the literature on the time inconsistency of policy (initiated
by Kydland and Prescott, 1977) and in the literature on central bank independence
(CBI) (e.g. Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini, 1991; Cukierman, 1992). However, to
our knowledge there have been no direct estimates of the adverse consequences of
political intervention in monetary policy.
In this paper we use data from a unique monetary ‘experiment’ conducted in
the UK during the period 1994-97 to investigate the cost of such intervention. Section
1 sets out the analytical framework and section 2 the empirical background, section 3
presents the empirical results, and section 4 concludes.
1 Analytical framework
In the original model of time-inconsistency due to Kydland and Prescott (1977) and in
its development by Barro and Gordon (1983), there is an inflationary bias as the result
of the fact that the policy-maker is assumed to have a target rate of output equal to the
Walrasian equilibrium rate, whereas the natural rate, at which inflation is constant, is
lower than the Walrasian equilibrium because of micro-level distortions and
imperfections.1 Formally, this can be presented in terms of a government loss function
L = π2+β(y-y*)2 [1]
and a ‘surprise’ supply function (short run Phillips curve):
y = α(π-Eπ) + ε [2]
where π is the rate of inflation, β  is the (relative) weight on output in the loss
function, y is the deviation of output from the natural rate, y* > 0 is the government’s
target level for y, that is the Walrasian equilibrium rate of output, α is the reciprocal
2of the slope of the short run Phillips curve, Eπ is the private sector’s expected rate of
inflation, and ε is a zero-mean white noise supply shock. The private sector forms its
expectations before the shock is realised, but the government sets its policy in the
light of the realised shock. The government minimises its loss function taking private
sector expectations as given, but under rational expectations the private sector
understands this and the equilibrium rate of inflation turns out to be
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where the first term on the right hand side is the inflation bias and the second term is
the unavoidable impact of the supply shock. This contrasts with the first best policy
result, which can be obtained by setting y* = 0, under which inflation is affected only
by the shock term:
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Note that the inflation bias is larger the flatter the Phillips curve, the higher the weight
on output in the loss function, and the greater the extent to which the government’s
target level of output is above the natural rate.
The first CBI solution to the inflation bias problem was presented by Rogoff
(1985) in his model of an inflation-averse central banker, whose loss function places a
higher weight on inflation than that of the government. In the present framework that
is a lower relative weight on output, i.e. a lower β, which makes the inflation bias
term smaller. On the other hand a lower β makes the effect of shocks on inflation
lower, and at the same time makes the variance of output higher.
Persson and Tabellini (1993) and Walsh (1995) explored the possibility that
the government could require the central bank to pay a penalty which varies with
3inflation if it misses the target inflation level of zero. In this case the loss function for
the monetary authority becomes
L = π2 + β(y-y*)2 - γ + δπ [8]
where the penalty is γ - δπ. Equilibrium inflation turns out to be
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If the penalty is set such that δ = 2αβy*, the inflation bias is exactly eliminated.
A somewhat different perspective has been taken more recently by Bean
(1998), who rejects the ‘social planner’ explanation of why the government’s target y*
is above the natural rate, that is the idea that y* is the (optimal) Walrasian equilibrium
rate, and argues that a more convincing view of the government’s objectives is that,
although they do not have a specific target for output, governments feel under
electoral pressure to deliver (via the whole range of their policies) a high level of
output. In addition, there is always doubt about the precise level of the natural rate of
output (or unemployment) and governments often have over-optimistic views of the
extent to which the country’s economic performance has improved under their
management; they are therefore inclined to take risks in over-stimulating the
economy, especially near elections. This implies a loss function as follows:
L = π2 + βy2 - ζy
according to the last term of which the government wants output to be higher.
Minimisation of this loss function in a context of rational expectations produces
βα
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where the inflation bias is now αζ/2, which varies positively with the extent to which
the government ‘cares’ about the level of output ζ.
4But as Bean points out, in this context the natural interpretation of central bank
independence is that the central bank’s loss function does not include the third term
above in output since the independent central banker has no need to signal
competence in this way and is therefore indifferent to the level (but not to the
variance) of output: the central bank has a mandate to pursue price stability tout court.
In this case its loss function is
L = π2 + βy2 [11]
and equilibrium inflation is
βα
αβε
π 21+
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Thus, as Bean puts it (1998, p. 1799), “it is the act of delegation itself that solves the
time inconsistency problem”.
In each of these models of CBI as the solution to time-inconsistency, though
perhaps most clearly in Bean’s, it is the contribution to policy decisions made by the
political authorities, as opposed to that made by the central bankers, which adversely
affects both expectations of inflation and the equilibrium rate of inflation. An
independent central bank delivers lower inflation than the political authorities in
Rogoff (1985) because it is more inflation-averse, while in Bean (1998) it delivers
lower inflation because, unlike the political authorities, it is not aiming for an
objective which is incompatible with zero (or constant) inflation.
2 Empirical background
Over the last 25 years, the UK has experienced a bewildering variety of monetary
policy regimes. The authorities successively introduced targets for broad money (in
1976), abandoned them (formally in 1987), moved towards exchange rate targets with
5an informal peg to the Deutschemark (between March 1987 and March 1988),
adopted a formal exchange rate target by entering the ERM in October 1990, and then
after the UK’s ignominious exit from the ERM in 1992 adopted the new monetary
policy framework which we investigate here – a combination of inflation targeting
and a new relationship between central bank and finance ministry. Finally in May
1997 the new government gave the Bank of England control of interest rates, with a
mandate to pursue an inflation target set by the government.
Between January 1994 and May 1997, monetary policy in the UK was meant
to be pursuing an inflation target set by the government,2 and the Bank of England as
central bank was required to offer its advice on interest rates to the Chancellor of the
Exchequer (the UK minister of finance) in the forum of a regular monthly meeting.
Interest rate decisions were taken by the Chancellor, who was not obliged to accept
the Bank’s advice and sometimes chose not to do so, but the Bank’s advice to him
would later be made public in the minutes of the monthly meeting.3
The financial markets were therefore able to see, with a certain time lag,
whether the Chancellor was accepting the Bank’s advice or whether he was rejecting
it. Since the Bank of England had no reason to pursue any objective other than price
stability as defined by the government’s inflation target, it would have been
reasonable for the financial markets to treat disagreements between the Chancellor
and the Bank as prima facie evidence that the political authorities were pursuing some
other objective; evidence of that kind could then be expected to lead to a fall in the
credibility of monetary policy.
The minutes provide enough information to make possible a five-fold
classification of the views of the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Governor of the
Bank of England. This classification, first developed in Cobham (1997), distinguishes
6between five different possible views: unequivocal preference for a rise in the interest
rate; a ‘bias’ towards a rise; no bias towards a rise or a cut; a ‘bias’ towards a cut; and
unequivocal preference for a cut. The classification for each of the monthly meetings
is given in Appendix I. Table 1 summarises the agreements and disagreements over
the period under investigation; if there had been no disagreements all meetings would
be classified along the diagonal, but as can be seen there were a significant number of
disagreements (17 out of 41) and all the disagreements were to one side (the south-
west) of the diagonal. If the disagreements had been the result purely of different
interpretations of rather noisy signals, then there would have been disagreements on
both sides of the diagonal. The fact that they were all on one side suggests that there
may have been a difference between the Bank and the Chancellor in their policy
objectives, with the Bank being systematically ‘tougher’.
Figure 1 shows the course of interest rates over the period with those
disagreements in which the interest rate was changed or not changed against the
expressed wishes of the Bank indicated by the arrows. Interest rates had been cut on
several occasions since the UK left the European Exchange Rate Mechanism on Black
Wednesday (16 September 1992), and by January 1994 stood at 5.5%. The Chancellor
made a further cut in February 1994, against the advice of the Governor who was
more cautious about inflation and more confident about growth. By September growth
was stronger and inflation still subdued, but the Chancellor and Governor agreed on a
pre-emptive 0.5% rise, and this was repeated in December and February 1995. By
May 1995 the Governor was worried by the fall in sterling and pressed for a further
rise but the Chancellor, basing his judgment on “a broad assessment of the economic
data, rather than market expectations”,4 argued that growth was now at a sustainable
rate and played down the inflationary implications of the recent depreciation. The
7Bank continued to press for rises in June and July, but was again rebuffed. Meanwhile
new information came to suggest that growth was not excessive and inflation was not
rising, and the Bank ceased to press for a rise. By the end of the year growth appeared
to have slowed and the prospects for inflation had improved. Between December 1995
and June 1996 there were two agreed and two disagreed 0.25% cuts in interest rates.
In September 1996 the Governor advised that the interest rate should be raised by a
full 0.5%, but the Chancellor demurred. He agreed to a 0.25% rise in October, but the
Bank continued to press for further rises in every month from December to April
1997. In the event, inflation on the official target measure just hit the 2.5% target at
the time of the 1997 election (though this was not known until afterwards).5
As far as we know, there is no other example of such an institutional
arrangement for decision-making in monetary policy, and it has now been
discontinued in the UK. Central banks have had higher or lower degrees of
independence, but typically for those whose independence is incomplete the
discussions between the central bankers and the political authorities are not publicly
known, or at least not in detail. For those which are largely independent, on the other
hand, the political authorities may press their views on the central bank, but they do so
largely in private and they do not take the decisions on interest rates.
In this paper we present a test of the proposition that visible political
intervention against the preferences of the central bank weakens the credibility of
monetary policy. We formulate this proposition in the form of the hypothesis that the
evidence on agreements and disagreements between the Chancellor and the Bank, as
captured in an ex ante index of credibility (explained in the next section), affected the
ex post credibility of policy as measured by the long term interest differential between
the UK and either Germany or the US.6
8Long term nominal bond yields can be thought of as consisting of four
elements: the expected real rate of return, the real rate risk premium, the expected
inflation rate over the relevant time horizon, and the inflation risk premium. With
respect to the differential between UK and German or US yields we assume that,
given capital mobility (and significant economic integration), the first two of these
elements are common to the three countries, and the last two elements together
comprise a measure of the credibility of monetary policy. Further, we assume that
because of their strong independence and established reputations the Bundesbank and
the Federal Reserve are expected by the financial markets to generate what amounts to
price stability. In that case the long term yields in Germany and the US can be treated
as benchmarks of high credibility, and we can treat the differential as an ex post
measure of the credibility of UK monetary policy.7
Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998) modelled UK monetary policy in the 1980s in
relation to Germany as the anchor currency of the exchange rate mechanism of the
European Monetary System, but Adam, Cobham and Girardin (2001) have shown that
UK monetary policy was influenced in the period considered here as much by US as
by German (short term) interest rates, and Artis and Zhang (e.g. 1999) have shown
that the UK business cycle has been much closer to that of the US. In this paper we
therefore consider the long term interest differentials between the UK and both
Germany and the US.
3 Data and cointegration analysis: the UK-German differential
Our data set for the empirical investigation comprised monthly data for the period
January 1994 to May 1997. This is a short sample, and it is not clear whether
stationarity tests are appropriate and efficient here. In addition, it is obvious that over
9the long run the variables concerned - a credibility index which is bounded between 0
and 1 and the interest differential between the UK and Germany - are very likely to be
stationary. However, in order to be sure that we are not picking up any spurious
correlation between the variables, we have chosen to carry out a full analysis with unit
root and then cointegration tests.
The ex ante credibility index CREDt was constructed on the interval [0,1] on
the basis of the classification of the views of both the Chancellor and the Bank given
in Appendix I. We assumed that at the beginning of the experiment the financial
markets had no hard information as to whether policy was seriously pursuing the
inflation target or not, so the initial value of the index was set at 0.5.8 In subsequent
periods the index adjusts upwards or downwards in the light of the evidence of
agreements or disagreements, according to the following formula:
 t1tt D1CREDCRED )( γγ −+= − , 0 < γ < 1
where CREDt is the ex ante index of credibility and D takes the value of 0 for a
disagreement and 1 for an agreement in the meeting of the current month.9 The
magnitude of γ indicates the inertia, and that of (1 - γ) the speed, with which
credibility adjusts in the light of the latest information on agreements/disagreements
between Chancellor and Bank.
This index is ad hoc, but it has some desirable properties in this context. First,
the index exhibits persistence: its value in any period is conditioned by its value in the
previous period, and it adjusts only gradually away from that as contrary evidence
accumulates. Secondly, the index is asymptotic to its extreme bounds (of 0 and 1): for
successive agreements (disagreements) the rise (fall) in the index gets progressively
smaller. Alternatively, agreements (disagreements) which are ‘against the run of
play’10 have a larger impact on the index. In a situation where there is scope for
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Chancellor and Bank to disagree about the interpretation of the noisy signals from the
economy as well as about underlying objectives, it seems plausible that the financial
markets would react in this way rather than, say, credibility collapsing to zero as soon
as one disagreement occurs (as in Backus and Driffill, 1985) or credibility collapsing
to zero but for one period only (as in Barro and Gordon, 1983).11
The interest rate differential which we considered first was defined as the
difference between the UK long-term government interest rate and the German long-
term government interest rate, IRDIFUKGE. The data are yields on 10-year
government bonds on the last day of the calendar month, as supplied by the Deutsche
Bundesbank. Figure 2 shows the course of both the interest differential and the
credibility index (with the value for γ chosen as below) over the period.
The first step of the empirical investigation was to identify the order of
IRDIFUKGE and CRED over the sample period by carrying out Dickey-Fuller and
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests, which were run for a range of values of the
adjustment parameter γ in CRED. In every case the variables were identified as I(1)
processes for this sample period. The results are available on request.
Next, in order to choose a value for the parameter γ in the credibility index, we
ran a series of simple regressions with the UK-German interest rate differential,
IRDIFUKGE, as the dependent variable and various measures of the credibility index,
CRED (each using a different value of γ), as the independent variable. As Table 2
shows, the equation which maximises the R2 and minimises the sum of squared
residuals is that for γ = 0.75. Thus in what follows the CRED measure which is used
is that for γ = 0.75.
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For estimation purposes the methodology of Hendry and Mizon (1993) was
followed, and the module of PcFiml as developed by Doornik and Hendry (1997) was
used.
We started with a 4 lags VAR, but were able to establish the adequacy of 3
lags through the use of likelihood ratio tests and the Akaike Information Criterion. In
the 3 lag VAR, as Table 3 shows, all the residual correlations are low and the
companion matrix of the dynamics has no eigenvalues on or outside the unit root
circle. Summary statistics and diagnostics on both the individual equations and the
VAR as a whole suggest that the residuals are white noise while ARCH and
heteroskedasticity tests imply the absence of misspecification. Gonzalo (1994) has
pointed out that the absence of normality does not affect either the number of
cointegration vectors or the coefficients obtained through the application of the
Johansen (1988) technique.
Table 4 reports the results of maximum eigenvalue, Tlog(1-λ), and trace
statistic, TΣlog(1-λ), tests which imply that the UK-German interest rate differential
and credibility are cointegrated. The next step in the empirical investigation was to
test jointly for the existence of a cointegrating vector and long-run weak exogeneity of
the credibility variable for the parameters in the interest rate differential equation.
This implies a single row in the β’ matrix and a single column in the α matrix of the
form (*, 0). The results are presented in Table 5. The restrictions are data acceptable.
The normalised coefficients of the cointegrating vector have acceptable signs while
the loading coefficient is, as expected, negative. Thus, the estimated cointegrating
vector can be interpreted as the long run equation
IRDIFUKGE = -0.39 CRED.
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In other words, there existed an inverse long run relationship between the two
variables, which suggests that the credibility of UK monetary policy was
systematically related to the agreements/disagreements between the Bank of England
and the Chancellor.
Next, we mapped the data to I(0) space. The results are presented in Table 6.
The individual equation diagnostic tests indicate that the residuals in this
parsimonious VAR are white noise and normally distributed, and that there are no
problems of arch and heteroskedasticity. The same table reports the coefficients on the
ECMs in both equations and it may be noted that the coefficient in the credibility
equation is insignificant. It follows then that the weak exogeneity conclusion is
confirmed, which permits the inclusion of contemporaneous observations of the
weakly exogenous variable CRED in the estimation of a conditional interest rate
differential equation. Finally, the preferred specification of the error correction
formulation of the long run interest rate differential equation is that presented in Table
7. All the diagnostic tests are satisfied and the implication is that the estimated
equation is a reasonably data coherent representation. The relatively large value of the
coefficient on the error correction term, 0.21, indicates that the speed of adjustment to
equilibrium is relatively fast.
4 The UK-US differential
We then proceeded to investigate the existence of a systematic relationship between
the UK-US interest rate differential IRDIFUKUS and credibility, using the same
procedures as those used for the UK-German differential.12 The preferred value for γ
was 0.98, but the eigenvalue test and trace test results shown in Table 8 indicated that
13
there was no cointegrating relationship between the IRDIFUKUS and our ex ante
measure of credibility.
To investigate this somewhat surprising result it is useful to examine the data
for the UK, US and German yields, as graphed in Figure 3. All three show similar
medium run trends - a sharp rise in 1994, followed by a gentle decline with a further
rise in early 1996 – which reflect the common international element in changing
perceptions of the prospects for economic growth and inflation. However, the US
yield is notably more volatile than the German yield, and this could explain the
econometric findings of a systematic relationship between credibility and the UK-
German but not the UK-US yield differential.13 The difference between the US and
Germany is probably best understood in terms of the lack of a clear nominal anchor
for monetary policy in the US under what has been called “a ‘just do it’ policy
regime”,14 and the US’s resulting greater exposure to what Goodfriend (1993) called
‘inflation scares’: in particular, Goodfriend (2001) has discussed the inflation scare of
1994, which he relates in part to the dispute arising from the Congress’s objection to
the Fed’s preemptive interest rate rises from February 1994. By contrast the Deutsche
Bundesbank had a formal commitment to monetary targeting which it used primarily
as a framework for explaining policy decisions that were arguably based on
something closer to inflation targeting.15 Moreover, on conventional measures such as
those of Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991) and Cukierman (1992) the
Bundesbank is a little more independent than the Federal Reserve Board.16 This
suggests that the US yield may have been relatively more influenced by country-
specific factors than the German yield. It is also worth noting that, despite Artis and
Zhang’s (1999) findings on the greater correlation of the UK with the US business
cycle over the period 1979-95, Angeloni and Dedola (1999) found that over the
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shorter period 1992-97 a number of indicators for the UK, including real GDP and
stock market indices, were more closely correlated with those in Germany than with
those in the US.
5 Concluding comments
The empirical results presented in section 3 are consistent with the hypothesis
formulated in section 2 that agreements and disagreements between the Chancellor
and the Bank, as captured in an ex ante index of credibility, affected the ex post
credibility of policy as measured by the long term interest differential between the UK
and Germany.17 These findings imply that the cost of political intervention in
monetary policy was substantial. Indeed, a simulation of the estimated equation
produces the result that, if there had been no disagreements between the Chancellor
and the Bank of England throughout the period, the long term interest differential
would have been 1.5% lower by April 1997 than it actually was, i.e. the interest rate
would have been 6.11% as against the actual value of 7.61% (with the German rate
then standing at 5.87%). The result that there was no systematic relationship between
the UK-US differential and the credibility index, on the other hand, probably reflects
differences in the operation of monetary policy and in other country-specific factors
affecting yields in the US and Germany.
Finally, two particular qualifications should be noted. First, the cost of
political intervention can be measured here only because the views of the central bank
were published; but their very publication placed a constraint of some kind on the
ability of the Chancellor to set interest rates in line with purely political
considerations.18 Thus the cost of political intervention in cases where no such
15
publication occurs but intervention is suspected in the markets may well be
significantly higher.
Second, Cobham (1997) has drawn attention to some strategic considerations,
which may have influenced the views of both players in this particular game. On
occasions the Bank may have had an incentive to shade its views towards those of the
Chancellor when the disagreement was small, in order to ensure that the shock of a
future disagreement remained a serious threat to the Chancellor. The Chancellor, on
the other hand, may have had an incentive to disagree with the Bank where the issue
was a marginal one, in order to try to diminish the shock of a disagreement with the
Bank and so increase his own room for manoeuvre. Insofar as these strategic
incentives affected the views on interest rates expressed by the two sides, and insofar
as that process was understood by the financial markets, the ex ante credibility of
monetary policy would have been less directly related to the extent of the observed
agreements and disagreements. However, to model this formally would be extremely
complicated.19 The fact that the basic hypothesis performs so well under the simpler
procedure adopted here is surely indicative of its robustness.
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NOTES
1 Subsequent research (discussed in, for example, Cukierman, 1992, and Persson and
Tabellini, 1997) has also put weight on other possible underlying causes of an
inflationary bias, including the desire to finance government deficits more cheaply
and political-electoral motives.
2  The target was 1-4%, with inflation to be in the lower half of this range by the end
of the Parliament (which meant no later than the spring of 1997). After May 1997 the
target was set, and has continued to be set, at 2.5%.
3 The official time lag for the publication of the minutes was about six weeks, but in
many cases the basic information had already leaked into the public domain before
then, for example as the result of comments made by the Governor of the Bank to the
House of Commons Treasury Committee.
4 Minutes of the Monthly Monetary Meeting, May 1995, paragraph 32.
5 Inflation dipped down to 2.5%  in April and May 1997, from  3.3% in November
1996 and 3.1% in January 1997, but rose again shortly after, reaching 3.0% in July
1997 and, after another dip, 3.2% in May 1998.
6 The fact that the data period is so short means that it would not be useful to look at
the outturn for inflation over the period, even if some subsequent period
corresponding to the relevant lag was included.
7 See King (1995) for an example of the use of the French-German long term yield
differential in this way.
8 The econometric work uses May 1994 as its start-date, partly because the decision to
publish the minutes of the Monthly Monetary Meetings was taken only in April, when
the minutes for the first three meetings were published, and partly to ensure that the
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initial index number of 0.5 had been thoroughly ‘digested’ by the start-date for the
estimation.
9 We considered whether the disagreements could be further separated into ‘large’ and
‘small’ disagreements. But there was only one case (June 1996) where the Bank and
the Chancellor were more than one class apart in terms of the classification of Table
1, and there was only one case (May 1995) where the Bank argued unequivocally for
a ½% rather than a ¼% change.
10  More precisely, agreements (disagreements) have a larger impact when the index is
relatively low (high).
11 See also Blinder’s (1999, p. 44) comments on reputation models, and King’s (1995,
p. 90) insistence that credibility is not ‘all-or-nothing’ but a continuous variable.
12 Data on US government bond yields was also obtained from the Deutsche
Bundesbank.
13 The raw correlations between the yields over the period January 1994-April 1997
are: UK-Germany 0.90, UK-US 0.67, Germany-US 0.71.
14 Mishkin (1999, p. 599). The phrase seems to have originated in McCallum (1995,
p209).
15 See, for example, Laubach and Posen (1997, p. 35): “The primary gains from
announced monetary targets have been through their use as a framework for publicly
indicating a monetary-policy stance and for explaining policy intentions with
reference to an underlying but public numerical inflation target.”
16 The Bundesbank’s independence and reputation is sometimes regarded as having
been put in doubt by the German government’s success in dictating the conversion
rate between Ostmarks and Deutschemarks at the time of German monetary union in
18
1990. However, the performance of the Bundesbank in raising interest rates
subsequently in order to bring inflation under control (at the cost of considerable
adverse effects for other ERM countries) has generally been seen in Europe as
confirming its status as an independent and anti-inflationary central bank. Our sample
starts in 1994 and ends in 1997, and we believe that over that period the credibility of
the Bundesbank was not in doubt.
17 It is worth noting that the Bank of England itself later recognised the basic
phenomenon identified here in a discussion of the period (King, 1999, p297): “Long-
term interest rates contained a risk premium to reflect the possibility that the timing
and magnitude of interest rate changes might reflect political considerations.”
18 The Governor of the Bank referred to the publication and other arrangements as
acting “as an additional check and balance to the Chancellor’s discretion” (Bank of
England Quarterly Bulletin, February 1997 p102).
19 These comments apply a fortiori to possible further, more sophisticated, strategic
considerations related, for example, to the preferences of each player for the success,
failure or further evolution of the monetary framework itself; or to the proximity of
the election, which might affect both the parameter γ and the behaviour of the
Chancellor. It is also worth noting that this was a short period in which the
monetary/institutional framework being operated was quite different from any
framework used before in the UK (or elsewhere); the participants were clearly in a
situation of imperfect information and uncompleted learning.
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Figure 1: Minimum lending rate 94- 97
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Figure 2: UK-German interest differential and credibility index
0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
2
Jan 94 Jul-94 Dec-94 Jul-95 Jan 96 Jul-96 Jan 97
Credibility index (  = 0.75) UK-German interest differential 
23
Figure 3: UK, German and US yields
5.00
6.00
7.00
8.00
9.00
10.00
Jan-94 Jul-94 Jan-95 Jul-95 Jan-96 Jul-96 Jan-97
UK Germany US
24
Table 1: The degree of agreement between Governor and Chancellor, January
1994 to May 1997
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5
B1 2
B2 2 3
B3 1 1 6
B4 4 8
B5 9 5
The entry in each cell indicates the number of Monthly Monetary Meetings at which
the views on interest rates expressed by the Governor and Chancellor were those
defined by the rows and columns concerned.
Key: C = Chancellor of the Exchequer
B = Bank of England Governor
1 = wants cut in interest rates
2 = bias towards cut but not justified in this case
3 = no bias for or against cut/rise
4 = bias towards rise but not justified in this case
5 = wants rise in interest rate
Source: Appendix.
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Table 2: Regression of IRDIFUKGE = C +  βCRED, for various values of γ
Sample: 1994:01 1997:05
CRED
(γ=0.70)
CRED
(γ=0.75)
CRED
(γ=0.80)
CRED
(γ=0.85)
CRED
(γ=0.90)
R-squared 0.054113 0.055143 0.053332 0.045311 0.025560
Adjusted R-squared 0.029859 0.030916 0.029058 0.020832 0.000574
S.E. of regression 0.255079 0.254940 0.255184 0.256263 0.258900
Sum squared resid 2.537546 2.534783 2.539642 2.561160 2.614145
Log likelihood -1.137803 -1.115469 -1.154725 -1.327686 -1.747465
Table 3: Residual Correlations, Dynamic Analysis, Goodness of fit and evaluation of
the system. Sample: 1994:04 1997:05
IRDIFUKGE CRED
IRDIFUKGE 1
CRED -0.26837 1
Eigenvalues of π(1)-I
|λα| 0.7947 0.1135
Eigenvalues of companion matrix
|λb| 0.5698 0.3667 0.3667 0.8604 0.6355 0.6355
Statistic IRDIFUKGE CRED VAR
σ
∧ 0.09657 0.12494
Far(3,27)      [p value] 1.5314 [0.2290] 1.5703 [0.2195]
Farch(3,24)    [p value] 0.3489 [0.7903] 0.1958 [0.8982]
Fhet(12,17)  [p value] 0.9334 [0.5382] 0.5396 [0.8668]
χ nd2  (2)       [p value] 10.339 [0.006]** 5.6445 [0.0595]
F ar
v (12,46) 1.8429 [0.0688]
χ vhet (36,45) 0.6986 [0.8655]
χ nd2 (4) 14.84   [0.005]**
Notes: F(-,-) and χ2(.) denote approximate null distributions, and the degrees of
freedom are in parentheses. Far is a Lagrange multiplier test for third-order residual
autocorrelation (see Harvey (1981)); χ nd2  is the normality test suggested by Doornik
and Hansen ( 1994); Farch is a Lagrange multiplier test for third-order ARCH residuals
due to Engle (1982); and Fhet checks whether the squared residuals depend on the
regressors and their squares (cf. White ( 1980));corresponding multivariate (system)
tests are denoted by ν (see Doornik and Hendry ( 1997)). Here and below, * and **
denote significance at 5% and 1 % respectively.
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TABLE 4: Cointegration analysis 1994 (05) to 1997 (04) of  IRDIFUKGE CRED
                    Eigenvalues:
 
0.504832  0.0534868
-Tlog(1-µ) T-nm
-TΣlog(1-
µ)
T-nmHo:rank=p
(eigenvalue test)
95%
(trace test)
95%
p=0 26.01** 21.79** 14.1 28.04** 23.49** 15.4
p≤1 2.034 1.704 3.8 2.034 1.704 3.8
Standardized β' eigenvectors
IRDIFUKGE CRED
1.0000 0.4052
-0.2365 1.0000
Standardized α coefficients
 IRDIFUKGE -0.74324  0.03109
CRED -0.12893 -0.10535
*Critical values from Osterwald-Lenum (1992)
TABLE 5: Restricted Cointegration analysis 1994 (05) to 1997 (05)
Standardized β’ eigenvectors and α=Αθ coefficients
IRDIFUKGE CRED
β’
(s.e)
1.0000 0.39121
(0.08457)
α
(s.e)
-0.77158
 (0.13826)
0.00000
LR-test, rank=1: Chi^2(1) = 0.5158 [0.4726]
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Table 6: Reduction to I(0). OLS estimates. Sample: 1994 (05) to 1997 (05)
DIRDIFUKGE =0.16*DIRDIFUKGE(-1)+ 0.04*DCRED(-1)+ 0.277*C -0.2127*CI(-1)
           (0.18)               (0.18)          (0.123)  (0.095)
DCRED = -0.075*DIRDIFUKGE(-1)+ 0.086*DCRED(-1) -0.119*C + 0.0865*CI(-1)
        (0.190)               (0.184)          (0.126)   (0.097)
Model diagnostic tests
Statistic DIRDIFUKGE DCRED VAR
σ
∧ 0.120 0.124
Far(3,30)     [p value] 1.955  [0.1421] 0.3460 [0.7920]
Farch(3,27)  [p value] 0.3363 [0.7993] 0.2527 [0.8587]
Fhet(6,26)  [p value] 0.3572 [0.8991] 0.6003 [0.7275]
χ nd2  (2)    [p value] 3.663  [0.1602] 0.9499 [0.6219]
F ar
v (12,52) 2.1723 [0.0273]*
F vhet (18,68)
0.8265 [0.6637]
F varch (27,61)
0.8999 [0.6637]
χ nd2 (4) 6.292  [0.1784]
Table 7: FIML estimates. Sample: 1994 (05) to 1997 (05)
DIRDIFUKGE =0.16*DIRDIFUKGE(-1) + 0.04*DCRED(-1)+ 0.277*C – 0.213*CI(-1)
           (0.19)                (0.18)           (0.12)    (0.095)
Model diagnostic tests
Statistic DIRDIFUKGE
σ
∧ 0.121
Far(3,30)       [p value] 1.9546      [0.1421]
Farch(3,27)    [p value] 0.3362      [0.7993]
Fhet(6,26)    [p value] 0.3572      [0.8992]
χ nd2  (2)       [p value] 3.6629      [0.1602]
TABLE 8: Cointegration analysis 1994 (05) to 1997 (04) of  IRDIFUKUS CREDγ98
                    Eigenvalues:
 
0.149858      0.030396
-Tlog(1-µ) T-nm
-TΣlog(1-
µ)
T-nmHo:rank=p
(eigenvalue test)
95%
(trace test)
95%
p=0 6.16938 15.67 7.34236 19.96
p≤1 1.17298 9.2 1.17297 9.2
*Critical values from Osterwald-Lenum (1992)
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Appendix I: Monthly Monetary Meetings 1994-97
Meeting Date Classification Interest rate
change
Resulting interest
rate level
1 12.1.94 B2-C2 5.5
2 2/3.2.94 B2-C1 -0.25 5.25
3 2.3.94 B2-C2 5.25
4 30.3.93 B2-C2 5.25
5 4.5.94 B3-C3 5.25
6 8.6.94 B4-C4 5.25
7 6.7.94 B4-C4 5.25
8 28.7.94 B4-C4 5.25
9 7.9.94* B5-C5 +0.5 5.75
10 26.9.94 B3-C3 5.75
11 2.11.94 B4-C4 5.75
12 7.12.94 B5-C5 +0.5 6.25
13 28.12.94 B3-C3 6.25
14 2.2.95 B5-C5 +0.5 6.75
15 8.3.95 B4-C4 6.75
16 5.4.95 B4-C3 6.75
17 5.5.95 B5-C4 6.75
18 7.6.95 B5-C4 6.75
19 5.7.95 B5-C4 6.75
20 27.7.95 B4-C4 6.75
21 7.9.95 B4-C3 6.75
22 29.9.95 B4-C4 6.75
23 1.11.95 B4-C4 6.75
24 13.12.95 B1-C1 -0.25 6.5
25 17.1.96 B2-C1 -0.25 6.25
26 7.2.96 B3-C3 6.25
27 7.3.96 B1-C1 -0.25 6.0
28 3.4.96 B3-C3 6.0
29 8.5.96 B3-C2 6.0
30 5.6.96 B3-C1 -0.25 5.75
31 3.7.96 B3-C3 5.75
32 30.7.96 B4-C3 5.75
33 4.9.96 B4-C3 5.75
34 23.9.96 B5-C4 5.75
35 30.10.96 B5-C5 + 0.25 6.0
36 11.12.96 B5-C4 6.0
37 15.1.97 B5-C4 6.0
38 5.2.97 B5-C4 6.0
39 5.3.97 B5-C4 6.0
40 10.4.97 B5-C4 6.0
41 6.5.97 B5-C5 +0.25 6.25
Note * The Chancellor decided on the change only on 9.9.94.
